Researcher: Jusur Hassan

Study Summary

1. Introduction: Historical and Conceptual Framework

The question of the origin of the Kurds and their national identity is among the central controversial issues in reading the demographic and political history of the Middle East. From a historical and linguistic perspective, the term “Kurd” developed into its clear and defined form only through Arabic-Islamic sources.

Historical records indicate that the Arabs were the first to use this term as a social description or to denote a way of life. It was applied to those living in the modern-day “Soran” region, as well as to describe certain Persian Bedouins. This has been documented in the seminal historical works of prominent historians such as al-Masʿūdī, al-Ṭabarī, and Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr.

With the political upheavals of the modern era and the rise of the concept of the “nation-state,” Kurdish nationalist movements strived to adopt this term and expand it demographically and geographically. This endeavor took on a “missionary” character, similar in structure to religious movements, as the political project was based on attempting to project, integrate, and impose the Kurdish identity onto indigenous and distinct peoples and groups such as Ezidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, and Lurs.

Consequently, the term transformed from a limited historical description into a political project aiming to construct national unity and expand influence in the Middle East.

2. Theoretical Framework: The Concept of the Nation and Its Determinants

To evaluate any national phenomenon, it is necessary to rely on a clear sociological and political reference. This study is based on the definition by nationalism scholar Hans Kohn, who defines nationalism as:

“the consciousness of a human community of its unity and distinctiveness, as well as its right to independence and self-determination.”

Researchers in political and social sciences agree that the emergence of a nation requires the presence of fundamental elements and prerequisites, which are as follows:

• The land (the homeland): the common, contiguous geographical territory.
• The people: the human mass residing within this territory.
• The language: the unifying means of communication and carrier of identity.
• The shared history: the narrative and experiences that build the collective consciousness.
• The shared culture: the system of values, traditions, customs, and symbols.
• The shared will: the voluntary desire for co-living and self-determination.
• The political authority: the institutional and material embodiment of national unity, if present.
• The religion: as a supporting or complementary element in some national models, such as in Zionism or in the Ezidi identity.

3. Analytical Study: Applying the Criteria to the Kurdish Reality

When the Kurdish reality, past and present, is subjected to the eight aforementioned prerequisites, profound structural problematics emerge, which can be explained through the following pillars:

3.1. Geographical Dispersal and Demographic Division: Land and People

The geography inhabited by Kurdish groups lacks fixed spatial contiguity and geographical connectivity. The distances between Kurds in Iraq and their counterparts in Azerbaijan, Syria, and other areas are considered very vast, which weakens the theory of “one contiguous land.”

On the level of the human element, while there are groups that define themselves under the label “Kurdish,” deep social and tribal divisions weaken the assumption of an organic unity of this people from the perspective of modern nationalism.

3.2. The Linguistic Problematic and the Absence of a Unified Language

Language is considered a fundamental pillar of any national consciousness, such as Arabic, English, or German, and a central instrument for preserving shared identity. In the Kurdish case, however, a profound linguistic and historical problematic emerges that negates the existence of a “unified” common language. Rather, it consists of a group of distinct languages that hinder mutual intelligibility.

This problematic can be broken down into the following approaches:

The Orientalist Role and the Unscientific Shift: The Role of Maurizio Garzoni

From the historical perspective of linguistics, Kurdish linguistic expressions were traditionally classified in academic circles merely as dialects branching off from the Persian language. This classification only changed through the efforts of the Italian missionary and researcher Maurizio Garzoni in the late 18th century, who worked to alter this perspective and present the “Kurdish language” to the world as an independent language.

However, this shift lacked a solid scientific foundation; neither Garzoni nor his successors determined from a linguistic standpoint the “base language” or mother tongue from which these alleged dialects are supposed to have branched. Consequently, the linguistic independence of Kurdish appears as a hypothesis lacking scientific roots.

The Deep Linguistic Divergence Between Groups

• A speaker of “Kurmanji” does not understand a speaker of “Zazaki” or “Sorani.”
• Speakers of “Lurish” and “Hawrami” do not possess mutual intelligibility.
• The linguistic-analytical approach: Among the striking indicators of this distance is that a Sorani speaker understands the Persian language more easily than the Kurdish Bahdini dialect, which exposes the extent of the linguistic rupture.

The Absence of a Standardized Standard Language as a Reference for Communication

For further linguistic clarification, a methodical comparison can be drawn with other living languages. All Arabic states, for instance, rely on the rules of “Standard Arabic” as a unified official and educational reference. This reference is unaffected by the differences in local dialects or the spoken “street language” in each country, as these colloquial dialects are originally branches of a single mother tongue.

Thus, even if there are speakers of distant dialects—such as a Moroccan, an Egyptian, and an Iraqi—who might not mutually understand their respective colloquial dialects, they still possess this common fundamental linguistic reference that enables mutual communication.

The same linguistic principle applies to other world languages. The English language in widely separated countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and Australia, as well as the German and French languages, each share the same standardized grammatical rules and a unified vocabulary that connects speakers.

In contrast, this unifying standard is completely missing in the Kurdish case. When speakers of Sorani, Kurmanji, and Lurish come together, they do not understand one another, with studies indicating that the structural and lexical difference between them reaches more than 75%.

In the absence of a unified “basic Kurdish language,” these speakers are forced to resort to an external language such as Arabic, Turkish, English, or Persian for mutual communication.

The Academic and Educational Division

This division is clearly evident in the educational institutions of the Kurdistan Region. For instance, students in the schools of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are taught the rules of the “Sorani” language, while students in the schools of Duhok and Zakho are taught the rules of the “Bahdini” or “Badini” language.

This completely contradicts the academic reality of living standard languages like Arabic, English, French, and German, which know no such academic division but instead adopt uniform linguistic rules taught in all educational institutions regardless of local dialects.

The existence of fundamentally different curricula and rules within a single region clearly proves the absence of a unified base language connecting them.

Linguistic Conclusion

This reality represents a clear scientific indicator that “Kurdish” is not a single language, but rather consists of scattered and distinct languages forcibly brought together within a single framework. In linguistics, this is considered a methodological error whose aim is to realize political interests and build a state at the expense of erasing the identities of other peoples, rather than being based on sound scientific foundations.

3.3. Cultural Fractures and Bloody Historical Memory

• Cultural divergence: The local cultures of the groups attributed to the Kurds are characterized by stark differences. The culture of the Zazas differs fundamentally from the cultures of Soran and Badinan. Similarly, the cultures of Kurmanji, Hawraman, and Faili each possess an independent character. The greatest paradox is manifested among the “Ezidis,” whose folklore, clothing, songs, as well as wedding and funeral rituals differ completely, leading the objective observer to conclude that they stand entirely outside the Kurdish cultural sphere.
• Shared history: Instead of a narrative of historical solidarity, history is filled with bloody conflicts with other components, which negates the element of unity. Among the most critical pieces of evidence are:
  • The massacres led by “Mir Muhammad,” known as Miri Kora, which cost the lives of thousands of Ezidis in the Shekhan region.
  • The massacres perpetrated by “Simko Shikak” against the Assyrian component.
  • The contemporary historical event of 2014, when Peshmerga forces suddenly withdrew from the Sinjar district, leaving the Ezidis unprotected against the terrorist organization ISIS. This is sociologically interpreted as a “betrayal of shared life.”

3.4. Religious Plurality and the Absence of a Shared Will

• Religion and identity: The Kurdish majority adheres to Islam, predominantly Sunni Islam, with a Shia component. In contrast, the indigenous religious and national components—Ezidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriacs—reject attempts to forcibly dissolve and assimilate them into the Kurdish identity.
• Religious persecution: History contains records of more than 74 campaigns of annihilation (Fermans) directed against the Ezidis, most of which were led by Kurdish Muslim forces. This tension extends to the present day; in 2024, public hate speech against Ezidis emerged from some Kurdish clerics in Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah without the authorities taking any deterrent measures.
• Absence of a shared will: As a result of the foregoing, a strong will is emerging today among broad segments of Ezidis, Zazas, Assyrians, and Chaldeans not to come under the umbrella of the “Kurdish nation” and to adhere to their right to distinct identities.

3.5. Construction of Collective Memory and the Imagined National Narrative

In the context of political sociology and national consciousness, the success of the Kurdish political project in attracting and convincing some distinct peoples and groups to align with the Kurdish identity can be explained by the concept of the “Imagined National Narrative.” This concept represents an academic extension of the theory of “Imagined Communities” by political scientist and historian Benedict Anderson.

Concept of the imagined national narrative: This concept serves as a precise analytical framework explaining how national identities are politically and socially constructed and manufactured. This narrative relies on the utilization of language, symbols, and the selection of historical events as well as their realigned reinterpretation to create a sense of organic belonging and a shared destiny among groups that are not necessarily linked by a unified demographic or historical origin.

Application to the case under study: The national political project succeeded in building a powerful and successful imagined narrative. Through continuous political mobilization, guided educational curricula, and cultural discourse, an alternative collective memory was entrenched. Over time, this narrative led groups and peoples with completely independent roots, histories, and cultures to be convinced that they are an inherent part of the “Kurdish nation.”

The adoption of a politically manufactured identity by these groups constitutes a scientific indicator of the success of the “imagined national narrative” in shaping social consciousness and absorbing indigenous identities into an artificial national melting pot that serves geopolitical goals and expansionist projects, without this necessarily reflecting an original demographic reality.

4. Conclusion and Results

Based on the analytical data and its juxtaposition with the criteria of the nationalist school, the study concludes that the Kurds do not form a “unified nation” in the scientific and academic sense of the term nation.

The lack of linguistic homogeneity along with cultural and religious divergence, coupled with a historical memory burdened by bloodshed and conflicts with minorities, render the idea of a “comprehensive Kurdish nation” more of a political project and an expansion of ideological influence rather than a deeply rooted sociological and historical fact.

The study reaffirms the principle of the right to determine one’s affiliation. Every group or individual possesses the absolute right to define their own national identity, whether they are Ezidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, or others. The policies of forced identity attribution practiced by some Kurdish nationalist currents represent a historical injustice against these components.

The work arrives at a fundamental political and historical rule according to which it is impossible to build a genuine and sustainable Kurdish unity or a Kurdish state at the expense of confiscating the identities of other peoples, regardless of how diverse the instruments of political utilization or historical falsification may be to serve these interests.

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